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Abstract 
‘Twister, developed by Miguel Freitas, is a social network platform centred around micro-blogging, 
much like Twitter. However, rather than relying on centralised servers owned and maintained by a 
single firm, Twister users operate a blockchain combined with DHT-like and BitTorrent-like protocols 
to both make posts and send private messages, and also to receive entries from other users. 
Twister’s raison d’etre is that it offers a social networking platform that cannot be censored and 
cannot itself censor. The software does not record the IP addresses users use to access the service, 
nor does it notify other users of an account’s online/offline status. Growing adoption of blockchain 
services means that it is possible that the concept of decentralised social networks could become a 
norm. It is suggested in this paper that blockchain-based peer-to-peer social networks present 
challenges to the current counter-extremist practices for content removal and censorship. Whilst there 
are methods to disrupt usage of blockchain-based peer-to-peer services, these approaches may have 
the net harm of curtailing bona fide use legal and novel technologies. Given this opportunity cost, non-
transitory online violent extremist content may need to be tolerated. 
 
Whilst the online social media landscape is today dominated by technology giants, such as 
Facebook with its roughly 1.94 billion monthly users,i this does not necessitate that the 
centralised, advertising revenue model of social networking will remain the norm. This 
centralised architecture, in which a service is offered in exchange for valuable data, is not 
the only viable means for social interaction and virtual community building mediated via the 
internet. A social media space does not need to be hosted at a centralised web domain. The 
world-wide-web is already decentralised; indeed, decentralisation and resilience are core 
tenets of the web’s raison d’etre. If the contemporary web can be described as ‘centralised’, 
this is socially-constructed, rather than preordained. 
 Using Miguel Freitas’s novel micro-blogging social network ‘Twister’ as a case study, 
this article considers the challenges that are presented by peer-to-peer blockchain-based 
social networks to the counter-extremism practice of content removal. The article is divided 
into four sections. The first section draws from the existing literature on violent extremist 
usage of social media to highlight: the extent to which violent extremists are deemed to be 
interested in using social media generally; the effectiveness of counter-extremist measures 
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against this usage; and the propensity of violent extremists to migrate to social media 
services where such counter-extremist measures become more difficult. The second section 
details the unique aspects of Twister’s methods for user registration and content 
dissemination. The third section examines the utility of peer-to-peer, blockchain-based 
microblogging for violent extremists. Lastly, the fourth section considers viable means by 
which state-based authorities could attempt to mitigate violent extremist activity on such 
networks, and suggests that a transition from content removal to content contention may be 
necessary.  
 
Violent Extremism and Social Media: Existing Literature 
A considerable literature exploring the utility of web communication, particularly social 
media, platforms for violent extremists already exists. However, this is a developing field and 
research gaps are present. In particular, as Conway has identified, there has been a general 
focus on particular online violent extremist content, but “not its producers or consumers, 
distribution mechanisms, or its functioning and effects”.ii Similar sentiment had been 
expressed by Zelin, who argued that research on the ‘conduits’ through which violent 
extremist material is disseminated has been insufficient.iii It is in this context that this article 
is written. It is useful, it is argued herein, to consider the utility of peer-to-peer, blockchain-
based social networks for violent extremists because violent extremists have expressed 
interest in alternative social media. It is also useful to consider the means by which other 
users of alternative social media and counter-extremist agencies could mitigate the use of 
such an online communication platform for violent extremist purposes. 
It is suggested in this article that Twister is a novel platform for creating virtual 
communities and disseminating content because of the challenge of censoring material 
hosted on it. Nevertheless, from a violent extremist perspective, Twister as a micro-blogging 
service shares some limitations of online communication platforms more broadly. As Burke 
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suggests, social media can be used to facilitate propaganda dissemination and can provoke 
people to offer financial support, but it will not kinetically alter on-the-ground power relations 
in a given violent conflict.iv Power exhibited amongst a given online virtual community does 
not, by default, automatically translate to ‘real’ power.v It is also worth recognising that 
access to the internet and social media services is not universal. In some cases, not only 
violent extremists but general populations may be prohibited from accessing social media 
because of restrictive local laws, the absence of affordable internet service provision, or 
indeed a dearth of reliable electricity.vi  
Nonetheless, violent extremists are unlikely to use social media arbitrarily. It has 
been suggested elsewhere that violent extremists use internet-mediated virtual communities 
for the planning of terrorist attacks,vii for recruiting personnel,viii establishing the possibility of 
a leaderless organisationix and for teaching recruits in ‘virtual classrooms’.x Social media 
could be said to have lowered the cost of participating in violent extremist and terrorist 
activity,xi even if cases of self-recruitment as a result of purely online content consumption 
could be considered rare.xii At the very least, for a violent extremist, the acquisition of online 
‘followers’ and the receipt of supportive messages from them is likely to provide a sense of 
political or ideological validation that, under certain circumstances, may be less forthcoming 
in their immediate ‘real world’ circles.xiii With text-based online mediums composed of 
information rather than matter, distinctions of identity and imbalances of power are “deferred, 
if not effaced”; as Peter Steiner captured in his New Yorker cartoon, on the internet, nobody 
knows you’re a dog.xiv 
Whilst violent extremist individuals and groups have precedent in maintaining web 
presences through the use of dedicated basic hypertext markup language (HTML) websites 
and forums, today such groups may span several networks and social media platforms.xv In 
2016, Europol’s Internet Referral Unit noted that they had identified in excess of 70 platforms 
used by terrorist organisations to spread propaganda materials.xvi Separate two-day joint 
Europol operations in 2017 identified violent extremist content disseminated across 41 and 
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52 platforms respectively.xvii In 2018, the UK’s Home Office revealed that Islamic State 
supporters had been found to use in excess of 400 online platforms during 2017.xviii These 
findings would suggest that the dissemination of violent extremist online material relies on an 
increasingly diverse ecosystem. The hosting of a dedicated website or forum posed some 
drawbacks. For instance, even prior to the Snowden revelations in 2012, it is known that 
violent extremists were aware that their online spaces were likely to be monitored and they 
conditioned their own behaviour on this basis.xix Users of some dedicated forums were 
warned against posting sensitive information on how to travel to a conflict zone, or construct 
an explosive, unless this was considered to already exist in the public domain.xx Forcible 
seizure of a server by law enforcement can reveal not only the content of forum messages 
and blog posts, but also private messages between users. It has been noted elsewhere that 
for violent extremists, the maintenance of a stable, persistent web presence has proven 
challenging.xxi  
For the violent extremist, outsourcing their web presence to popular social media 
platforms does not guarantee a persistent online presence. Research in this field has, for 
example, shown that violent extremist accounts on Twitter have become increasingly 
transitory. When Berger and Morgan analysed 20,000 Islamic State-supporting Twitter 
accounts in the period September 2014 to January 2015, they found that just 3.4 percent of 
these accounts were suspended over the five months.xxii Conversely, Conway et al’s 
Disrupting Daesh report analysing Islamic State-supporting accounts and broader Jihad-
supporting accounts operational on Twitter between 1 February and 7 April 2017 highlighted 
that Twitter’s anti-extremist operations had gained significant traction since 2014, with 
conservatively 65 percent of Islamic State-supporting accounts suspended during this 
period.xxiii The authors noted that by April 2017, Islamic State-supporting Twitter accounts 
had increasingly adopted meaningless usernames of jumbled letters and numbers, and 
either left their avatars as the default ‘egg’ or uploaded a benign image.xxiv Conway et al 
proposed that Islamic State supporters were likely to be migrating their operations to 
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Telegram, given that “a conscious, supportive and influential virtual community” had become 
“almost impossible to maintain”xxv on Twitter. Far-right extreme groups have also 
experienced censorship and account suspension on Twitter’s services, following changes to 
the Twitter User Agreement which came into force on 18 December 2017.xxvi 
It is in this context – a hardening social media environment for the outspoken violent 
extremist – that this article is written. Telegram, an encrypted communication program 
released in 2013 for smartphones and computers is, of course, not the only alternative to the 
dominant communication platforms that has attracted interest from violent extremists. One 
notable alternative social media platform is Diaspora, which launched in 2010. Diaspora is a 
distributed social networking service that allows users to establish their own ‘pods’, which 
can either be public or closed. Control of the content hosted on a given pod is governed by 
the owner of the server, known as the ‘podmin’. In August 2014, it was reported on the 
Diaspora blog that an unspecified number of Islamic State-supporting accounts had been 
established on the main Diaspora pod, ‘JoinDiaspora.com’, as well as other pods on the 
Diaspora network.xxvii From the perspective of the violent extremist, however, Diaspora 
inherits limitations shared by the more prominent mainstream centralised social media 
networks. The ‘podmin’ of a Diaspora server has read and write privileges over unencrypted 
data of the users on their pod. Whilst this issue may be partially assuaged in the case of a 
closed Diaspora pod operated by an individual empathetic to a given violent extremist cause, 
it remains that their server is a fixed and vulnerable point of attack or seizure by law 
enforcement. Furthermore, the continued and uninterrupted operation of a given pod relies 
upon the continual operation of the podmin’s server. Bielenberg et al ‘crawled’ the Diaspora 
network between June and November 2011, and found that over 35 percent of the servers 
that they pinged were never online across the period of 150 days, half of the servers had 
less than 50 percent uptime, and only the top 20 percent of servers were able to maintain an 
uptime in excess of 90 percent.xxviii A hypothetical pod that is amenable to a violent extremist 
presence may not be able to foster a vibrant virtual community if it is not able to sustain a 
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persistent uptime. Were a given pod to unexpectedly go offline, users might assume that the 
server had been seized by law enforcement and may therefore not entrust it with their 
proscribed communications if it were to return online.  
Diaspora and Twister are two alternative social media networks amongst many. 
Sharing similarities with Diaspora, Mastodonxxix is a ‘federated’ social media microblogging 
network. Scuttlebutt is a social network that uses a Bitcoin-like blockchain to register users 
similarly to Twister’s model.xxx  
Twister – or a similar alternative – may offer a partial fix for this inherent trade-off of 
privacy, trust, and persistence that violent extremists engage with in order to sustain online 
virtual communities. Twister’s implementation consciously adopted the micro-blogging 
format that has made Twitter a popular ‘universalised’xxxi form of online communication. 
Unlike Diaspora, however, Twister’s network is not compartmentalised into independently-
run servers. Instead, each Twister user operates a ‘node’ that helps to ensure the continued 
persistence of the network. Twister offers an encrypted platform for the construction of virtual 
communities with no single point of attack. The next section describes the technologies that 
have made a peer-to-peer, blockchain-based social network possible and have given rise to 
potential virtual communities built upon what can be termed ‘trustless trust’. 
 
Twister, BitTorrent and the Blockchain 
One of the core technologies that enables Twister to function as a fully decentralised, 
continually operational social network is the ‘blockchain’. Whilst Twister’s blockchain is 
patched and unique to the social network, other blockchains exist. Indeed, amongst other 
uses, blockchains can be used to share data between health providers and indefinitely store 
contracts and land registries.xxxii However, the seminal utility of the blockchain was 
demonstrated by Bitcoin. In October 2008, someone – or several persons – using the 
pseudonym ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ posted a white paper to the Cryptography Mailing list. This 
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white paper detailed the outline of a digital currency called ‘Bitcoin’.xxxiii ‘Bitcoin’, which is 
essentially a computer program, serves two core functions: firstly, it is an electronic 
commodity, and secondly, it is an open source protocol for pseudo-anonymous trading. 
Whilst other digital currencies have existed, it was the blockchain that made Bitcoin unique. 
Bitcoin’s blockchain is a distributed public ledger of all transactions that have ever occurred 
via the Bitcoin protocol. Bitcoins are not printed or distributed by a central bank in the same 
way that fiat currencies are produced; instead, a computer algorithm ensures that new 
Bitcoins are created roughly every ten minutes. ‘Miners’ compete for these freshly minted 
Bitcoins with their computing power, by directing their machines to multiply large numbers in 
the search for a unique ‘hash’.xxxiv These miners serve two core functions for the Bitcoin 
protocol; firstly, their mining power serves to secure the existence of the network, and 
secondly, each successful ‘hash’ that they find creates a new ‘block’ on the blockchain. Each 
new block incorporates transactions that Bitcoin users are attempting to make, and once a 
transaction is included into a block and disseminated across the Bitcoin network it is 
considered ‘confirmed’. 
 Initially, miners were rewarded with 50 Bitcoins for each block that they successfully 
generated; however, over time, this reward ‘halves’, until eventually, in around the year 
2140, the finite limit of 21 million mined Bitcoins will have been reached and no more can be 
generated.xxxv Miners are currently rewarded with 12 Bitcoins, and the next ‘halving’ is set to 
occur in 2020. Given that, at the time of writing, a Bitcoin trades for around $15,283,xxxvi 
there is a substantial motivation for Bitcoin miners to out-compete their competitors. The 
extent of this mining competition, which substantially secures the network, is relatively 
exceptional. As will be detailed later, the incentive to mine the Twister network is 
exponentially lower. During the outset of Bitcoin’s introduction, when a Bitcoin would have 
been worth fractions of a cent, it was possible to successfully mine blocks with the CPU of a 
domestic laptop or desktop computer. Competition for reward Bitcoins produced an arms 
race of computing power however, which caused miners to begin using graphics cards for 
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their mining operations, until these were replaced by purpose-built ‘ASICs’,xxxvii industrial 
computers whose sole purpose is to churn out as many hash calculations as their silicon 
permits. Today it is impossible to profitably mine Bitcoins with a non-ASIC machine. The 
mining ‘difficulty’xxxviii has to increase to match the computing power of the network, so that 
the roughly ten minute rate of block generation can be maintained. In February 2018, the 
hash rate of the entire network is in excess of 21.5 trillion GH/s; in the same month the year 
before, it was just over 3.1 trillion GH/s.xxxix Concentrated in regions that offer low ambient 
temperatures and inexpensive electricity – notably mountainous Chinaxl and Chelan County 
in Washington state, USAxli – the electricity demanded by global computing power 
underpinning the Bitcoin network is said to exceed the energy consumption of Nigeria or the 
Republic of Ireland.xlii The computational power underpinning the Twister network is 
exponentially lower.xliii As will be discussed later with reference to two mining experiments 
conducted by this author, the low difficulty democratises the ability to benefit from Twister’s 
mining reward implementation, but also makes Twister’s blockchain theoretically easier to 
corrupt. 
 Twister is a social network developed by Miguel Freitas and released in 2014. It is 
currently at the ‘beta’ stage of live development, but is freely available to download, compile 
and use.xliv Twister is a microblogging platform that shares similarities with the model offered 
by Twitter; users can upload character-limited posts for other users to view, ‘follow’ other 
users, read their posts and send direct messages between themselves. However, rather 
than relying on centralised servers to record user activity and disseminate content, Twister is 
novel in that it uses the Blockchain, Kademlia-like DHT and BitTorrent-like protocols to 
connect users and distribute data between them. A DHT is a decentralised distribution 
system that provides a lookup service between nodes; in this case each Twister user 
represents a unique node. The BitTorrent protocol facilitates a peer-to-peer network for 
disseminating computer files, including but not limited to: music, films, software and 3D 
printing designs.xlv  Computer scientists had, for some time, sought to implement bona fide 
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peer-to-peer networks.xlvi However, overcoming the challenges of data storage and user 
authentication had proven challenging. Three years into its lifespan, the Twister network is 
purportedly comprised 1,819,510 posts, or ‘twists’.xlvii  
 In order to function as a virtual community in which posts are tied to specific 
accounts, a social network has to record a given identity for its users. This serves two 
purposes. Firstly, if a user has registered a particular username, they do not have to register 
a unique identity each time that they access the service or post content. Secondly, 
registering a given username prevents other users from using the same identity and falsely 
posting content under the guise of another user. Rather than registering usernames to a 
central database, the Twister network uses its own blockchain to keep the records. 
Accordingly, when a user installs the software onto their computer and has downloaded the 
full copy of the blockchain, they can input a username that they would like to use, which their 
‘node’ will check against the blockchain. If the username is available, the name is broadcast 
to other nodes on the Twister network, and the user waits until the name is included in a 
‘block’. A private encryption key is generated and stored on the user’s hard drive; this private 
key provides the user access to their account in much the same way that a Bitcoin user 
retains access to their wallet addresses. The private key can be copied by the user and used 
on other devices to access the same account. Once the username is included into a block, 
this block is disseminated across the network and other nodes will become aware of the 
account’s existence. Unlike Bitcoin, there is no direct financial incentive for miners to expend 
electricity and computational power to generate blocks. However, miners on the Twister 
network are rewarded by entering a lottery for free advertising. These free adverts are 
disseminated to all nodes, although a user should only encounter one such advert in any 
given 24 hour period. 
 The Twister network blockchain would be an inefficient means of distributing post 
content. Were the blockchain used as the content database, all users would have to 
indiscriminately download a potentially very large blockchain, irrespective of whether they 
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were interested posts’ content. Using the blockchain for content dissemination would also be 
unsatisfactory for users who wish to post and access content instantaneously, given that 
posts would need to wait for a new block to be generated before being accepted by the 
network. Instead, Kademlia-like DHT and BitTorrent-like protocols are used; when a user 
sends a request to view a given user’s feed, the content should be received almost instantly. 
There is some precedent for violent extremist usage of the BitTorrent protocol. Violent 
extremists have used the BitTorrent protocol to access and disseminate extremist material, 
ideological documents, and guidance manuals for bomb-making.xlviii It is also worth noting 
that micro-blogging is not the only utility that is made possible through the combination of 
blockchain and BitTorrent technology. ‘Zeronet’ is a peer-to-peer, blockchain-based network 
for the hosting of static and dynamic websites.xlix Instead of associating a website with a 
given IP address, websites that are hosted on the Zeronet network are associated with 
public addresses listed on the blockchain; much like the public-facing addresses of a Bitcoin 
wallet. So long as at least one computer is ‘seeding’ a given Zeronet webpage, other users 
will be able to access it. In theory, Zeronet offers the possibility of technical resilience 
against traditional means of pressure for content removal, such as DMCA takedown notices. 
Samata Ullah – jailed in the UK in May 2017 on five terrorism offences including 
membership of Islamic State and the preparation of terrorist acts – had admitted researching 
Zeronet and had authored a blog hosted on the network.l 
 Miguel Freitas, Twister’s creator, has noted in interviews that whilst he is fond of 
Twitter and actively uses its services,li he became concerned that its utility for quickly 
disseminating information during a potential future Brazilian riot could be reduced if the 
Brazilian state or Twitter itself decided that it would be expedient to shut down the free flow 
of information. Freitas expressed similar alarm about the British government’s rhetoric 
regarding internet communication freedom amidst the 2011 London riots.lii For Freitas, the 
notion of curtailing information flows was “totally against the idea of the internet, where you 
are supposed to have no single point of failure”.liii 
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 Twister is a technical solution to resist blocking and censorship of online content and 
communications. The technical novelty of a blockchain-based peer-to-peer network proffers 
some legal considerations. Because it does not rely on central hosting by a unitary entity, 
there is no single figure or organisation for authorities to pursue for content removal. 
Twister’s source code is released and distributed under a MIT/BSD license.liv This, the 
creator has suggested, protects Twister “from most, if not all legal procedures meant to shut 
it down”.lv The source code could not be made illegal, and even if legal action were to be 
pursued against the network’s creator, the network would continue to function as a court 
could not successfully enforce its shutdown. Enforcing legal measures against open-source 
peer-to-peer blockchain technology in general may be impracticable, whether the blockchain 
is for the Twister, Zeronet, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin or indeed other network. In order for 
there to be potential for successful enforcement against a disseminated blockchain, ‘joint 
liability’ would need to be introduced and imposed.lvi As Low and Teo point out however, 
such enforcement would be highly impractical, because copies of a given blockchain are 
likely to be held across multiple jurisdictions, and users cannot be obligated to update their 
copy to a particular version.lvii As has been demonstrated by the experience of the Ethereum 
cryptocurrency, two or more communities operating nodes on a blockchain can use differing 
code to force a ‘hard fork’.lviii However, a hard fork on a given network does not overwrite an 
original blockchain with a new one; the new and old blockchains can continue operating 
independently with separate communities of nodes adhering to different code. 
 The Twister network does not have a central administrator who can delete user 
accounts or suspend their ability to make posts, send private messages and commit 
computational power to compete for advertising. Furthermore, unlike Twitter and Facebook, 
Twister does not apply an algorithm to filter the content that users see; content is delivered 
to nodes instantaneously, as-is. Whilst filtering could be implemented, this would be a local 
filter, configured by a user on their personal node, much like a spam filter on a POP3/IMAP 
email client.lix As a social network, Twister is novel because users are not obligated to trust a 
 12 
third party in the same way that they would when using Twitter, Facebook, or a federated 
service such as Diaspora. Trust is a central component of successful human interaction in a 
contemporary society;lx as human beings, we are able to trust other people on the basis of 
what we know about them, our family ties to them and information garnered about a given 
person from other sources that we trust, but this kind of trust is limited. If an inter-subjectively 
valued ‘radius of trust’ does not exist, every social interaction descends into a prisoner’s 
dilemma. In order for the ‘radius of trust’ to expand sufficiently to nurture a functional society, 
a ‘trust architecture’ needs to exist.lxi Werbach argued that until the invention of the 
blockchain, “there were two primary trust architectures: Leviathan (deference to a central 
enforcement authority) and peer-to-peer (reliance on social norms and other governance 
mechanisms in tight-knit communities)”.lxii  
 Werbach suggested that ‘trustless trust’ – epitomised in software form by the 
blockchain – made it “possible to trust the outputs of a system without trusting any actor 
within it”.lxiii Granted, the code underpinning the Twister network’s blockchain is subjectively 
rather than objectively written given that human beings authored it. However, because the 
source code is open source, anyone with the requisite knowledge can review the code, 
make alterations and submit them to peer-review, which diminishes – although does not 
eradicate – the perceived risks of trusting the network’s development community.  
 It is this condition of ‘trustless trust’ that presents the potential utility of peer-to-peer 
blockchain-based social networking to political dissidents and violent extremists alike. 
Similarly, it is the condition of ‘trustless trust’ that may force a rethink of current counter-
extremism efforts that rely on the cooperation of a ‘trusted’ figure such as a central 
administrator or domain owner. 
 
A Storm on the Horizon? The Utility of Blockchain-based Social Networks for Violent 
Extremists 
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As has been noted above, Twister’s current content base is small.lxiv Assessing whether any 
of these posts relate to violent extremist content is difficult. A researcher interested in 
combing through Twitter user data can do so either through Twitter’s search function, or by 
requesting data from the API. Twister, conversely, does not have this user-friendly 
functionality. Twister’s ‘search’ bar provides a user limited search functionality to find user 
names registered to the blockchain, but one cannot search for post content. TwisterIO.com 
and Twistnik.ru are advertised as search engines for the Twister network, but at the time of 
writing, they appear to have limited functionality. In theory, clicking on another user’s name 
will instantly display their posts, in date order. However, not all posts will necessarily be 
immediately accessible, particularly if they are older posts. On-demand retrieval of historical 
post content relies on a computer already in possession of the content that can ‘seed’ it on 
request via the BitTorrent protocol. This article has not been written on the basis of concrete 
evidence pointing to the existence of violent extremist virtual communities on the Twister 
network. Nevertheless, given that violent extremists have expressed interest in alternative 
social media, it is useful to consider the utility of a peer-to-peer, blockchain-based social 
network for the violent extremist. Similarly, it is useful to consider the means by which other 
users of alternative social media and counter-extremist agencies could mitigate the use of 
such an online communication platform for violent extremist purposes. 
 As discussed above, online communication platforms have offered a degree of utility 
for violent extremists who wish to disseminate propaganda material relatively quickly and 
inexpensively. Benson has noted that internet-mediated communication has allowed violent 
extremists the attractive prospect of dividing their ‘operational’ wing from their ‘propaganda’ 
wing.lxv The ‘operational’ wing can be afforded the anonymity that may be necessary to carry 
out successful on-the-ground maneuvers, whilst the online platforms empower the 
‘propaganda’ wing which can disseminate material without even having any tangible contact 
with their kinetically violent counterparts. This broad division structures the ensuing 
discussion. It is suggested here that a peer-to-peer, blockchain-based microblogging 
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platform could be useful for both the ‘propaganda’ and ‘operational’ components of violent 
extremist activity. 
 For an ‘operational’ community of violent extremists, there is one core utility that 
Twister could prove useful for. This is Twister’s direct messaging function, which could serve 
as an alternative to the popular ‘Bitmessage’ service, an encrypted peer-to-peer 
communication service that violent extremists have been encouraged to use.lxvi A violent 
extremist could create a seemingly innocuous Twister account, using a randomised 
combination of letters and numbers, and pass this to their peers. These associates, who 
could have similar accounts, would then be able to ‘follow’ this account, which they can elect 
to do publicly or privately. Once two accounts are following one another, they are able to 
send and receive direct messages between themselves. Users can also create ‘groups’ for 
group messaging. The end-to-end encrypted message will not be visible to any user other 
than the intended recipient. Direct messages between Twister users are not ‘stored’ or 
retrospectively viewable in plaintext in the same way that a Twitter direct message, or a 
conventional email might be. The only means by which a direct message can be accessed is 
to be in possession of the private key to the sending or recipient account. Additional security 
may be offered if the users are connecting to the network through a VPN and storing their 
private keys on a discrete or hidden removable storage device. The extremist could zero-out 
the removable storage device and smash it apart, or re-use it to store new keys. In principle, 
this could make the direct messaging service of a peer-to-peer, blockchain-based 
microblogging platform a feasible means of communicating instantly across long distances, 
with a degree of plausible deniability. Given that the only direct cost to a user who uses their 
node to broadcast a request for a new account is the time expended waiting for the name to 
be included in the next mined block, ‘operational’ violent extremists could discard accounts 
much like they may discard inexpensive ‘burner’ mobile phones. The tangible cost of 
creating new accounts – the mining of the requisite block – is shouldered by those voluntarily 
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choosing to commit computational power to mining and is manifest in their electricity 
consumption and hardware wear and tear. 
 A peer-to-peer, blockchain-based microblogging service may also be useful for the 
‘propaganda’ wing of a violent extremist organisation. Propaganda can only serve its 
purpose if it is seen and digested by an audience. If violent extremist online content – and 
the user accounts used to upload and re-broadcast the content – are transitory because of 
active censorship by the host platform, the utility of the content may be limited. Violent 
extremists would need to play a whack-a-mole game with the administrators and moderators 
of the host platform. A hosted item of violent extremist content does not necessarily exist in a 
vacuum. From the perspective of the violent extremist, censorship may be a particular 
nuisance not just for ‘out-links’ (links to platforms outside of the host platform), but also for 
‘in-links’ (links within the host platform). Research by Conway et al regarding Islamic State 
and other Jihadist use of Twitter identified that 14 percent of pro-Islamic State and 7.5 
percent of Other Jihadist tweets included an in-link.lxvii Such in-linking provides moderators 
with the ability to map pathways between suspected violent extremist accounts. 
 A peer-to-peer, blockchain-based microblogging service such as Twister mitigates 
the necessity for the violent extremist to play the whack-a-mole game in order to maintain a 
persistent presence. So long as a Twister user retains the private key linked to their public 
address that registered their account in the blockchain, their free access to their account and 
their ability to post content is assured. Whilst the overall content base of the Twister network 
is small, especially vis-a-vis mainstream proprietary social networks, it is possible that a 
Twister account could serve as a useful violent extremist propaganda resource on several 
fronts. Firstly, an account could be used as a resilient, non-transitory space for the blogging 
of updates on the progress of a given violent extremist cause. Particularly of interest for 
violent extremists who are keen to produce and disseminate video outputs,lxviii posts need 
not necessarily be limited to text. In May 2016, experimental WebTorrent media embedding 
was introduced to the Twister network, making video and image hosting possible.lxix 
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Secondly, whilst in-linking is not yet implemented in the network, Twister could already 
provide a service for the archiving of shortened out-links to content elsewhere on the 
internet.  
A third and novel utility draws on Twister’s mining-reward implementation. As noted 
previously, unlike the Bitcoin network which rewards its mining community with the 
opportunity to win a diminishing supply of freshly-minted Bitcoins, the Twister network 
rewards its miners with the opportunity to win free advertising. An ‘advert’ is a single post of 
140 characters. When a miner successfully mines a new block to the network’s blockchain, a 
‘promoted’ post of their authorship is disseminated and attached – by their choosing – either 
to their username or to the anonymous ‘nobody’ tag. Twister users can select a tab on the 
graphical user interface to specifically view ‘promoted’ posts in descending chronological 
order. In addition, miners enter a lottery for ‘pushed’ advertising, in which there is a chance 
that their promoted message may be shown to other Twister users on their generic timeline 
feed. 
Because the mining-reward advertising discriminates on the basis of the 
computational power that a miner commits to calculating hashes, rather than on the content 
of a promoted message, a violent extremist might find mining to be a useful mechanism for 
disseminating propaganda. There was an instance on 1 June 2017 when a miner using the 
anonymous ‘nobody’ tag successfully mined blocks and was rewarded with five promoted 
antisemitic messages.lxx The next day, a Twister user flagged this to Freitas, who responded 
publicly with the post “hmmm, I have yet to see these assholes you’re talking about. Content 
filtering, freedom x anonymity x abuse is always a tricky business”.lxxi 
 On 18 December 2017, this author committed a desktop computer with a quad-core 
Intel 5 processor, 8gb of ram and a GeForce GTX 650ti graphics card to mining on the 
Twister network. This experiment was run to observe the hardware power that a violent 
extremist might require if they wished to make promoted posts to the network and potentially 
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benefit from the advertising lottery. The computer mined for four hours, between 1630 and 
2030 GMT, when the stated mining ‘difficulty’ was 0.00355891 and the latest mined block 
was block 216068. The author set any promoted posts to be distributed under the guise of 
the anonymous ‘nobody’ tag, and the text of promoted posts were manually-inputted quotes 
from the popular television sitcom, Seinfeld. At 1709:20 GMT, the computer had successfully 
mined its first block, number 216070. Over the four-hour period, the computer was rewarded 
with a total of eleven promoted Seinfeld quotes. The interface for chronological ‘promoted 
messages’ avoids displaying duplicate consecutive promoted messages and the latest 
identical promoted message subsumes those before it, so the actual number of blocks 
successfully mined by the computer may be marginally more than eleven. The mining 
difficulty is set and adjusted by the protocol so that in theory, a new block is added to the 
blockchain roughly every ten minutes. On paper, over a four-hour period, one would expect 
that ~24 blocks may be added to the blockchain. In this case, 33 blocks were added to the 
blockchain over the four-hour period, which is an unexceptional fluctuation. The Intel 5 
processor was therefore able to mine at least one-third of the blocks generated during the 
running of the experiment. It was apparent that blocks were also mined by three people 
other than the author. On 21 December 2017, the author ran the experiment a second time 
between 1130 and 1530 GMT, using the same computer. The mining difficulty was the same 
as it had been during the initial experiment. The latest mined block before the experiment 
began was 216538. Over the four hours, a total of 32 blocks were added to the blockchain. 
The computer successfully mined ten of these blocks, the first of which was block 216543 at 
1216:14 GMT, and from these the computer was rewarded with seven manually-inputted 
promoted Seinfeld quotes. During the running of the second experiment, it was apparent that 
the mining community was slightly more diverse; blocks were mined by five individuals other 
than the author, three of whom were the same individuals who had successfully mined 
blocks during the first experiment. 
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 Whilst this data is anecdotal, it does suggest that three years into its lifespan, the 
computational power underpinning the Twister network’s blockchain is small. For 
comparison, the Bitcoin network’s mining operation, with a difficulty of 1,590,896,927,258 on 
21 December 2017,lxxii would have ignored the computer that the author used for the mining 
experiments. The Twister network’s mining difficulty at the time of the experiments was lower 
than it had been in June 2017, when the author had initially written this paper for the 
Terrorism and Social Media conference at Swansea University.lxxiii The weakness of the 
computational power underpinning the mining process of the Twister network has 
implications for the opportunities afforded to both the hypothetical violent extremist and the 
counter-extremist. 
 From the perspective of the hypothetical violent extremist, the opportunity is relatively 
obvious; at the time of writing, with just one unexceptional processor, they could commit 
computational power to the network and receive a sizeable proportion of the promoted posts 
afforded to successful miners. Such messages could be disseminated to hundreds or 
thousands of active users. One use for promoted messages might be to alert potentially like-
minded individuals that they could join an extremist community by sending the promoter a 
private message. Alternatively, given that the Twister network supports hashtags, promoted 
messages could notify potentially like-minded individuals that they can engage in real-time 
discussions on extremist matters if they used a particular hashtag. Even if the general user 
population were not remotely interested in extremist material – and indeed may reject it – the 
appearance of pushed promoted extremist content could serve as a digital ‘graffiti tag’, 
demonstrating a violent extremist’s willingness to engage with alternative social media. 
 Whilst this author does not suggest that a Twister-like platform would replace the 
online platforms currently used by violent extremists, it is apparent that the Twister network 
may have some utility for a violent extremist’s purposes. Particularly because of the 
censorship-free nature of the network, it has been suggested that violent extremists could be 
attracted to the possibility of escaping a ‘whack-a-mole’ operation that they may need to 
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routinely employ in reaction to moderation activity on proprietary, censored platforms. The 
next section details approaches that could be used by counter-extremists as part of an 
operation to mitigate hypothetical violent extremist usage of a peer-to-peer, blockchain-
based microblogging platform. 
 
Countering Violent Extremist Usage of Blockchain-based Social Networks 
This section considers some approaches that could be undertaken by counter-extremists 
against peer-to-peer, blockchain-based microblogging platforms. There are some windows 
of opportunity, which draw on the same opportunities afforded to the hypothetical violent 
extremist, that are worth considering. It has been remarked by others that technological 
development is outpacing institutional change and the resources committed to developing 
new technologies exceed those dedicated to governing new technologies.lxxiv Whilst it may 
once have been possible to prevent the movement of encrypted technology across 
borders,lxxv today peer-to-peer, encrypted communication services fit with the increasing 
privatisation and proliferation of consumer-targeted empowering technologies, many of 
which were once the solely the domain of national defence departments. Such technologies 
include consumer-oriented drones, 3D printing, driverless cars and cyber-offense toolkits, 
amongst myriad other technologies. It is in this context that the counter-extremist would 
approach the task of policing or attempting to exert influence over a peer-to-peer, 
blockchain-based microblogging platform. 
 One window of opportunity for the counter-extremist would be to use accounts on the 
network to post information relating to their endeavor (e.g. promote a link to their anti-
extremism website or content). Secondly, whilst violent extremists may be able to use 
Twister’s ‘hashtag’ functionality, there would be nothing stopping counter-extremists 
commandeering such hashtags to offer banal or countering narratives.lxxvi Thirdly, given that 
non-direct message posts are publicly viewable, the counter-extremist could identify prolific 
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‘propaganda’ accounts and collect associated data for intelligence purposes. The counter-
extremist might code a bot specifically for this purpose, which could automatically follow all 
accounts on the network and download all publicly available posts. Whilst the counter-
extremist could not delete these posts nor lobby a central domain owner for their removal, 
the data could prove useful from open source intelligence (OSINT) and signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) perspectives. 
 Just as the mining process does not discriminate against the hypothetical violent 
extremist, the computational weakness of the mining operation underpinning the Twister 
network could also present opportunities to counter-extremists. Again, one opportunity is 
obvious: a counter-extremist could commit some computational power to mining on the 
network and use any rewarded promoted posts to refute an extremist narrative and provide a 
shortened out-link to a website or email address for reporting extremist content. This 
approach would not undermine the network. Alternatively, however, there is the potential to 
cause disruption against the network itself. This could be achieved by exploiting a 
vulnerability inherent to decentralised, non-discriminatory peer-to-peer blockchains, which is 
the risk that they may be undermined by a ‘51 percent attack’. A ‘51 percent attack’, 
sometimes known as a ‘majority attack’, would be a betrayal of the pillar of ‘trustless trust’ 
that the blockchain relies upon. In order to conduct a majority attack, a perpetrator would 
need to modify the code running their ‘node’. The attack would be more likely, and 
sustained, for each percentage point majority that the perpetrator could achieve. The Bitcoin 
community has expressed concern about the potential of a majority attack, given that in June 
2014, the mining pool ‘Ghash.io’ controlled 51 percent of the hash power on the network.lxxvii 
A successful perpetrator of a majority attack against the Bitcoin network would have the 
opportunity to reverse recent transactions and double-spend Bitcoins. An attack on the 
Bitcoin network may be unlikely, because of the profits that a successful attacker would 
forego as a result of the sabotage.lxxviii With the microblogging platform, however, the 
successful perpetrator of a majority attack could have the opportunity to retrospectively 
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delete some recently-created accounts, or, perhaps more significantly, prevent new users 
from creating accounts by intentionally mining empty blocks. However, because the 
blockchain is used for account registration and not the dissemination of posts, the successful 
majority attacker could not prevent existing accounts from making public posts or from 
sending private messages. As a result, it is suggested here that this would be an ineffective 
counter-extremist measure. The intentional prevention of new account creation would prove 
irritating to a hypothetical violent extremist looking to join the network, and to those who may 
wish to replace an existing account with a new ‘burner’ account, but the net harm of this 
approach is that all potential new users would be prevented from creating accounts. 
Disgruntled developers would not be structurally prevented from modifying the code and 
releasing a new version of a peer-to-peer microblogging platform. 
Internationally, there appears to be growing official rhetoric regarding the necessity 
for proprietary mainstream platforms to make greater financial and staffing efforts to prevent 
their profit-making services from being used for violent extremist purposes.lxxix As has been 
indicated by the literature considered earlier in this article,lxxx and by the reports of 
organisations such as the UK and EU Internet Referral Units,lxxxi there is evidence that 
content removal on such online platforms has gained traction. However, in the future, today 
may be retrospectively viewed as a ‘golden age’ for the feasibility of online content removal. 
As open-source encrypted peer-to-peer technologies become increasingly adopted, the 
dominance of closed, proprietary online communication platforms that extract advertising 
revenue from the private data of the individual may not be assured. Within the foreseeable 
future, counter-extremist organisations such as the UK’s Internet Referral Unit may not be 
afforded the luxury of a central authority that they can pressure for content removal. If a 
given item of offensive violent extremist content is disseminated through BitTorrent-like 
protocols on services such as Twister or Zeronet, the content is likely to remain accessible 
for as long as at least one person is willing to ‘seed’ the relevant torrent file with their 
computer. In this sense, whilst certain items of violent extremist content may be proscribed 
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under the domestic laws of a given jurisdiction, successfully enforcing these laws may not be 
possible in all cases. With encrypted, fully peer-to-peer hosting, the law of computer codelxxxii 
may override legislated regulation. In an era of decentralised, diffuse technology, ‘code is 
law’ can be actioned by both state and non-state agents. Just as ‘code is law’ enabled, for 
instance, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ to ‘unlawfully’ collect the online communication data of British 
citizens for 17 years,lxxxiii the motivated individual – extremist or otherwise – is empowered to 
make efforts to evade online surveillance and online censorship. 
 A hypothetical violent extremist could significantly improve the privacy of their 
seeding operations by connecting to their desired peer-to-peer services through a VPN. 
However, as has been noted regarding the feasibility of prosecuting music, film and game 
BitTorrent filesharers,lxxxiv even if the perpetrator were to use their true IP address, the 
evidence collected by monitoring the IP address would tie the activity to a given internet 
address but not a particular individual. On the basis of IP data alone, a prosecution could not 
be assured success. A risk of prosecution has not prevented relatively widespread use of 
BitTorrent services for illicit activity. In 2009, 15 percent of Americans polled by Pew 
admitted to illicit file-sharing using BitTorrent software.lxxxv Research in 2015 by Sandvine 
found that the overall share of bandwidth in North America used by BitTorrent data had 
declined due to the increasing popularity of bandwidth-heavy services such as Netflix and 
Youtube, but BitTorrent traffic still represented 26.83 percent of ‘upstream’ data, a decline 
from 36.35 percent two years earlier.lxxxvi 
 Whilst violent extremist content hosted in an encrypted peer-to-peer manner may 
have the potential to be technically resilient, this does not necessarily make it socially 
resilient. The ability to host and access difficult-to-remove violent extremist content through 
use of encrypted peer-to-peer channels does not mean that the material will be compelling. 
There is perhaps a risk that fetishising online violent extremist content could artificially 
manufacture a compelling narrative to the content through overt reactions by law 
enforcement and policy making communities. Conway has suggested that “there is no yet 
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proven connection between consumption of and networking around violent extremist online 
content and adoption of extremist ideology and/or engagement in violent extremism and 
terrorism”.lxxxvii Notwithstanding perceived online causality of violent extremism, the notion of 
‘radicalisation’ itself has not been without controversy. In particular, ‘radicalisation’ as a 
concept has been criticised for possessing an ambiguous, subjective definition and for 
lacking empirical data linking causality to violent behaviour.lxxxviii 
 If online extremist content is an ideological ‘virus’ of sortslxxxix that cannot be 
eradicated altogether but which may, or may not, have the potential to incite people into 
committing acts of violence, citizens should be encouraged to develop the effective antibody 
of a critical mind. When violent extremists elect to use social media to further their agenda – 
whether the platforms are mainstream or alternative – they give their narrative(s) visibility 
and open a space for them to be critiqued.xc On Twister, for instance, just as with Twitter, 
Youtube and Facebook, there is nothing structurally preventing non-extremist users from 
responding to extremist content with satire and ridicule.xci When 4chan users reproduced 
imagery of Islamic State fighters by superimposing rubber ducks and toilet brushes onto 
them, the bravado of the images was replaced with disarming humour.xcii This is, of course, 
not to promote flippancy or disregard for online material that could be extremely offensive or 
which could, in some circumstances, provoke individuals to align with a violent cause. 
However, this author agrees with the suggestion of Bartlett and Krasodomski-Jones; in a 
context of limited counter-extremist resources, the most worthwhile approach may be to 
develop users’ critical faculties so that ideologies can be rejected and ensure that top-down 
human resources are best placed to prevent violent behaviour, rather than chase 
uncomfortable propaganda around the internet.xciii The greater the pressure applied to 
proprietary, mainstream services to enact counter-extremist censorship measures on their 
services, the faster these platforms will become untenable for sustaining viable violent 
extremist communities, which will likely encourage them to migrate to services that offer 
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them technical resilience against disruptive censorship, rather than give up on internet-
mediated communication altogether. 
 
Conclusion 
Technology and software have empowered individuals to communicate seamlessly across 
borders either with the assistance of centralised, privately-owned platforms, or without them. 
2017 was an exceptional year for the blockchain’s most prominent case study, the Bitcoin 
cryptocurrency, with a surge in public and media interest. According to Google, “How to buy 
Bitcoin” was the second most-asked ‘How to’ question of 2017, and “What is Bitcoin” was the 
fourth most-asked ‘What is’ question.xciv The encrypted peer-to-peer blockchain-based cat is 
out of the bag. 
 This article has argued that violent extremists experiencing difficulty maintaining 
viable, persistent presences on social media platforms may elect to eschew mainstream 
platforms on which they are increasingly censored, in favour of alternative platforms where 
they are not. A violent extremist who made a conscious decision to operate a node on the 
Twister network, for instance, could retain sovereignty over the content that they post and 
access. It has been suggested that a network such as Twister could offer utility for both 
‘operational’ and ‘propaganda-producing’ violent extremists. Policing and moderating violent 
extremist communities on alternative social media platforms is likely to present challenges 
for counter-extremist organisations such as the UK’s Internet Referral Unit, which rely on the 
cooperation of domain owners and ISPs for content removal. Encryption and internet-
mediated communication has significantly bolstered the UK economy,xcv which makes 
disrupting the technologies that enable peer-to-peer blockchain-based online platforms to 
exist an untenable approach to counter-extremism. It is plausible that counter-extremist 
practices towards online content may, not through preference but through necessity, need to 
shift from a focus on content removal, to content contention.  
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